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In recent times, economic historians have reexamined the antebellum period. Popularly 
characterized as having chaotic and “wildcat” banking episodes, economic historians have 
sought to find an alternative explanation for the failures of the system. Rolnick and Weber’s 
(1983, 1984) review of the period suggested the cause of the failures was not the lack of 
regulations, but rather the regulations themselves. The requirement for the free banks to hold 
long-term bonds to back short-term liabilities was a recipe for bank panics during the significant 
downturn in bond prices. Most investigations have examined the period ex post and focused on 
the banks that failed. Only two studies, by Dwyer and Hafer (2003) and Jaremski (2010), have 
examined ex ante bank behavior prior to a downturn to determine whether bank failures were 
caused by banks that were taking too much risk. As Dwyer and Hafer’s discussed, were these 
banks taking excess risk due to lack of regulation or were they instead impacted by an 
unexpected and sudden large decline in the price of bonds? 
 Dwyer and Hafer (2003) found that free banks in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin that 
took greater ex ante risk were more likely to fail.1 These assessments of ex ante portfolio risks of 
free banks were evaluated further in another study. Jaremski (2010) found that free banks with 
greater asset diversification with loans and fewer notes in circulation were more likely to 
survive. Previous studies have assessed the ex ante decision making of banks prior to crises and 
others have indicated ex post that greater regulation of the banks’ bond portfolios would have 
reduced failures. However, these studies do not explain adequately if the banks adjusted their 
risks in times of higher market uncertainty in order to avoid potential bankruptcy. For this study, 
                                                          
1
 Dwyer and Hasan (2005) then examined the suspension of specie payments in Wisconsin versus in Illinois and 
determined that there was a lower likelihood of bank closures and noteholder losses in Wisconsin than Illinois. 
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some of the data for bond prices was found sourced from Dwyer (1999), quotations in Banker’s 
Magazine, and Sylla (2003). I have also discovered new bond pricing data from issues of the 
American Railroad Journal during this period and have combined the prices found in that journal 
with the other sources I have listed to use a more complete pricing data for my analysis. 
This study will make assessments regarding the ex ante portfolio allocation of the Illinois 
free banks to market conditions; however, it will also investigate whether the free banks actively 
made changes in their portfolios in response to political developments prior to the Civil War. In 
the 1850s, free banks faced two significant declines in bond prices over a short period of time 
providing sufficient experience for managers to understand the inherent risks of their portfolio, 
but potentially little time to make adjustments. These events should have provided sufficient 
uncertainty of Southern debt to warrant Northern banks hedging their portfolios. My analysis 
will help explain whether banks were active in managing risk and if they responded to political 
events during 1860 up until Lincoln's election. 
The decision-making of Illinois free banks in constructing their bond portfolios can be 
assessed by examining their choices given the information that was publically available at the 
time. Since bond pricing data was published in periodicals and other sources, it is possible to 
determine whether banks were properly taking into account the historical risk variability in 
constructing their bond portfolio. Two measures of risk are used. Value-at-risk, the amount of 
the bank’s portfolio at risk during low likelihood negative events, and the Sharpe ratio, which 
helps to measure each bank’s risk per unit of expected return, will be methods of assessing the 
security allocation of the ex ante free bank bond portfolios. While these decisions would become 
important during the panics of 1854 and 1857, they would also be important later in Illinois’ free 
banking period as the Civil War developed and bond prices declined. By looking at what reports 
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were available in newspapers at any point in time and changes that free banks made to their bond 
holdings on their balance sheets, it will help assess whether banks reacted to events effecting 
political risk, such as the nomination of Lincoln as the Republican candidate for President in the 
May of 1860. It will not assess changes after the presidential election of 1860, since that would 
no longer be an assessment of ex ante decision-making. 
The results of the study indicate that both the value-at-risk and the Sharpe ratio decreased 
from November of 1858 to November of 1860. For banks that were already in existence in 1858, 
however, there was greater value-at-risk and greater amounts of Southern bond holdings in 1860 
versus banks that entered the market between 1858 and 1860. For all of the banks in 1860, 
greater amounts of Southern bonds were associated with higher levels of value-at-risk and lower 
Sharpe ratios. Additionally, using the total market bond portfolio in 1858, which had greater 
holdings of Southern bonds, as a benchmark for the 1858-1860 period banks operating in 1858 
slightly lowered their value-at-risk over the two years relative to the benchmark in 1858. This 
reduction in risk was due to the greater net inflows of lower risk Northern bonds versus Southern 
bonds overall from 1858 to 1860. Following the May nomination of Lincoln for the November 
presidential election, however, Southern bond net inflows actually increased versus earlier in the 
1858-1860 period. Overall, while adjustments were made to the bond portfolios of the Illinois 
free banks to reduce Southern bond exposure, the Illinois free banks appeared to be taking undue 
risk since the Southern bonds remained a large portion of their portfolio in November 1860 
despite indications being from 1858-1860 that they were more risky. This study's addition of 
more complete and new price data has allowed for more extensive quantitative analysis of the 
free banking era in Illinois, along with analysis of whether the markets reacted to political events 
during 1860 prior to the October and November elections.  
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2. Free Banking, Illinois Legislation and Early Developments 
 The period of free banking in the United States from about 1838 to 1860 enabled banks to 
begin operations without government charters as long as they met the statutory requirements 
including minimum investment with specified state or federal bonds deposited with the Illinois 
Auditor and meeting redemption requests for gold specie on demand. This development followed 
the dissolution of the Second Bank of the United States that had served as the U.S. central bank 
in 1836. In contrast to the prior banking system, free banking made entry into banking more 
possible given businessmen had the necessary funds. Free bankers who purchased state or federal 
bonds that met the statutory coupon interest rate requirement and deposited them with the Illinois 
Auditor were then issued banknotes by the Illinois Auditor. Banknotes of each free bank then 
functioned as a paper currency, but, by law, each bank needed to redeem its banknotes for gold 
specie on demand. Free banks could then exchange their banknotes with the public in order to 
issue loans as well as to add to their gold specie reserves in order to fulfill banknote redemption 
requests.2 
Free banking was established in Illinois following prolonged political debate. In the 
1840s, the Whig Party supported the establishment of a general banking law that would allow 
free banking to develop, whereas the Democratic Party favored the banning of banks and instead 
supported gold specie being used as a currency.3 The Whigs had opposed a third Bank of the 
United States, instead favoring the establishment of local banking that free banking would 
permit. Chartered banking had allowed banks to issue notes based on each bank’s equity and 
                                                          
2
 Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber. “Explaining the Demand for Free Bank Notes.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 2, no. 1 (1988), pg. 4. 
3
  George Dowrie, The Development of Banking in Illinois (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,  
1913), pg. 132. 
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these notes were redeemable in specie. However, free banking would allow entry into the market 
to be easier provided that a bank had the necessary capital.4 When the Democrats gained control 
of the Illinois state legislature in 1847 and presided over the writing of the 1848 Illinois 
Constitution, they included provisions that prohibited the State of Illinois from becoming a 
shareholder in any bank and required bank shareholders to be personally liable for bank 
liabilities.5 The new Constitution superseded the 1818 Constitution written soon after Illinois 
became a state.6 After free banking legislation was passed by the Illinois legislature in 1851, it 
was initially vetoed by Illinois Governor Augustus French, a Democrat; however, the legislature 
overrode his veto and the legislation became law following a legislatively required referendum.7 
The 1851 Illinois legislation was based on the free banking laws of the State of New 
York, which were believed to have been successful up to that point.8 The laws initially allowed 
banknotes to be issued with the security of both U.S. treasuries and bonds issued by state 
governments.9 U.S. treasuries and state bonds, excluding Illinois, were to be valued for note 
issuance based on the average price in the prior six months of trading in New York, but not 
exceeding the bonds’ par value.10 The law required that Illinois bonds could only be valued at 
80% of their market based on the average price in New York trading for the previous 6 months, 
but not exceeding the bonds’ par value.11 The haircut applied initially to Illinois bonds was 
                                                          
4
 Andrew Economopolous, “The Illinois Free Banking Experience,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Vol. 20, 
No. 2. (1988), pg. 250. 
5
 Dowire, The Development of Banking in Illinois, pg. 134. 
6
 Frank Kopecky and Mary Sherman Harris. “Understanding the Illinois Constitution.” Illinois Bar Foundation (1986), 
pg. 2. 
7
 Dowire, The Development of Banking in Illinois, pg. 138. 
8
 Ibid. pg. 138 
9
 General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 17
th
 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker, 
Printers, 1851), pg. 163 
10
 Ibid. pg. 164 
11
 Ibid. pg. 163 
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intended to promote increased diversification of the free banks’ bond portfolios.12 Additionally, 
banknotes could only be issued to a free bank at the market value by the Illinois Auditor if the 
bonds had a coupon rate of 6%, with a 50% haircut if the coupon rate was below 6%.13 Each 
bank was required to have $50,000 worth of U.S. and state bonds in order to begin operations 
and needed to be deposited with the Illinois Auditor.14 If banknotes that were in circulation were 
not redeemed by the bank in question in gold specie on demand, the Illinois Auditor was to 
redeem these notes following the sale of the bonds deposited with the Illinois Auditor.15 The law 
also specified what happened if banks’ bond holdings declined in value and if the bank did not 
choose to deposit additional bonds or to redeem enough of their circulation so that their collateral 
would be sufficient security for their note issue outstanding.16 Under these circumstances, a free 
bank would be closed and noteholders would have their notes redeemed in gold specie following 
the sale by the Illinois Auditor in New York City of the state securities that were serving as 
collateral for the note issue.17 If the Illinois Auditor did not have sufficient funds after selling the 
bond collateral to fully redeem the noteholders, the noteholders would be redeemed in gold 
specie based on their pro rata share of banknote circulation outstanding.18 
 The 1851 law also required three bank commissioners to be appointed by the Governor in 
order to oversee the accounting statements and financial conditions of the free banks.19 The 
commissioners were to report their audits of the banks to the Illinois Auditor on an annual 
                                                          
12
 Benjamin Chabot, et al. Bank Panics, Government Guarantees, and the Long-Run Size of the Financial Sector: 
Evidence from Free-Banking America. (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper, 2013), pg. 15 
13
 Ibid. and 17
th
 General Assembly. pg. 163 
14




 Report of the Bank Commissioners of the State of Illinois (Springfield: Office of the Bank Commissioners,  








 General Assembly. pg. 169 
19
 Ibid. pg. 171 
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basis.20 The reports issued on each bank included the amount of bonds held, the value of real 
estate, claims on debt issued to other banks, debts owed to other banks, banknotes in circulation, 
loans, and holdings of other banks’ banknotes.21 The purpose of the audits was to determine 
whether banks were following the free banking laws’ requirements, including the amount of 
notes in circulation, average specie on hand, and whether interest charged on loans followed 
legal requirements22 The upper limit on interest for debt that was either issued or incurred by a 
free bank was placed at 7%, which served as a usury provision of the legislation.23 Shareholders 
in each free bank faced double liability for the debts and other liabilities that their bank incurred 
if the bank itself failed to meet the liabilities.24 
2.1. Cause of Bank Failures 
The “wildcat banking” hypothesis for free bank failures was established Hammond 
(1957) and Knox (1903).25 Those researchers believed that free banks only having an asset 
requirement for establishment allowed banks to make it difficult for noteholders to seek 
redemption by establishing in towns with a low population.26 Rockoff (1974) researched the 
topic further and discussed how establishing a bank in an area with a low population allowed a 
free bank to be issued banknotes and to put them into circulation, but made it difficult for 
noteholders to redeem them for gold.27 He then theorized that the so-called “wildcat bankers” 
                                                          
20




 General Assembly. pg. 172 
22








 General Assembly. pg. 173 
25




 Hugh Rockoff. “The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 6, No. 2: 
(May 1974), pg. 148 
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could profit by receiving banknotes based on the par value of the bond by backing the notes with 
bonds trading below par and then putting the banknotes into circulation.28 
For purpose of their analysis, Rolnick and Weber (1984) used two criteria to define a 
failed bank has having met the wildcat banking explanation: if their bond holdings were trading 
below par and if they were in business for less than a year.29 Economopoulos (1988) applied the 
Rolnick and Weber criteria to Illinois and found that asset price decline was more responsible for 
failures. Only 11 of the 104 banks in Illinois were consistent with the criteria for wildcat banks.30 
Seventy-four of the 104 failed banks analyzed failed during periods of declining asset prices, 
indicating that the overall market was responsible for more of the bank failures.31 Two of the 104 
failed banks analyzed met the criteria of declining asset prices and wildcat banking.32 
Futhermore, Economopoulos (1988) used three additional criteria for a wildcat bank: being 
operational for less than a year, the town they are located in having less than the 200 residents 
statutorily required, and if the bank purchased bonds when the bank would receive more notes 
based on the par value than the bond’s actual market value.33 Economopoulos found that 52 of 
the Illinois banks had no wildcat characteristics, 37 had at least one wildcat characteristic, and 
only one had all three characteristics.34 He concluded that wildcat banking was not the primary 
cause of bank failures, instead finding that most free banks failed during periods of declining 
asset prices.35 He also found that free banks failing to meet a request from the bank 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. pg. 145 
29
 Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber. “The Causes of Free Bank Failures: A Detailed Examination.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 14. (1984) pg. 11 
30






 Ibid. 254, 261 
34





commissioner to deposit additional securities, in order to meet collateral requirements, was 
responsible for more of the failures than banks’ failure to redeem noteholders in gold.36 
Subsequent amendments to the free banking law were in reaction to financial panics and 
perceived abuses of the banking law by “wildcat bankers.” The term “wildcat banking” refers to 
banks that opened for a short-period, and it has been deemed as the cause of free bank failures 
and the failure of banks to redeem banknotes. If a decline in the bonds deposited by free banks is 
to blame for the failure to redeem banknotes rather than fraudulent activity, the ex ante allocation 
of bonds purchased by the free banks and their ability to respond to events in the marketplace is 
of greater importance. 
2.2 Amendments to the Free Banking Law and Other Developments 
Over time, amendments were passed by the Illinois legislature in reaction to how the free 
banks functioned and problems that were observed over time. In August of 1853, amendments 
were passed by the Illinois legislature in an attempt to prevent the circulation of other certificates 
of deposit that had been functioning similarly to banknotes as currency despite the issuing 
entities not being organized under the free banking laws of Illinois.37 The provisions of the 
amendments stated that any payments made with illegal bills or certificates of deposit were null 
and void.38 It allowed the payee to sue to recover payment from anyone who had used the illegal 
financial instrument to pay a bill owed to that entity or person.39 The amendments also permitted 
the Illinois Auditor to place banks that violated these laws regarding illegal methods of payment 




 Joseph William Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863 (University of Chicago, 1939), pg. 40. 
38
 General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 18
th
 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker, 





into liquidation.40  The effect of increasing substitution into legal banknotes would also increase 
the amount of loans and other activities that could be initiated by free banks, allowing for the 
potential of greater profits. 
 The 7% interest rate on bank loans that was instituted as a usury provision in the 1851 
legislation was not being uniformly followed. In an 1854 report by the Illinois Bank 
Commissioners, it was noted that free banks were making loans to other corporate entities that 
then made loans at a 10% rate of interest.41 The Commissioners noted that the low valuation of 
Illinois bonds at 80% for note issuance decreased the return on those bonds, but if accepted at a 
par valuation would allow banks to increase their earnings without exceeding the usury rate.42 
2.3 Development of Banking in Illinois and Free Banking Competitors 
 To understand the context of free banking in Illinois, it is important to recognize how 
Chicago grew as a city of economic importance in the United States and how banking 
competitors negatively impacted free banking in Chicago and resulted in changes to the free 
banking law. Developments regarding transportation in Chicago helped accelerate the city’s 
economic dominance, as the Illinois-Michigan canal was completed by April 1848 and thousands 
of miles of railroads were emanating from the city by 1854.43 Agricultural produce increasingly 
went through Chicago to travel to the eastern United States and Europe following the building of 
this infrastructure, as travel west to St. Louis or Galena, Illinois decreased.44 This infrastructure 
allowed Chicago to participate more fully in the American economy, with the growth of banks in 








 Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 9. 
44
 Ibid. pg. 10 
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the city reflecting this development.45 Free banking did not completely dominate the financial 
landscape of Illinois, however, as other entities sought to compete with them with the banknote 
market. The Chicago Marine and Fire Insurance Company, later known as the Marine Company 
of Chicago, had certificates of deposit (CDs) that were readily redeemed for gold, although this 
company’s CDs were not usually used as currency.46 
Financier George Smith and others, however, were inspired by this company in his 
development of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company.47 Free banks criticized the 
Wisconsin Company since people who wanted gold specie were more likely to redeem the free 
banks’ notes at par rather than redeem Smith’s CDs at a discount.48 The 1853 amendments to the 
Illinois banking law made banknote issuance explicitly illegal for companies that were not 
authorized to issue notes.49 The competition between the Chicago free banks and the illegal bank 
entities did lead all of the Chicago free banks to liquidate prior to the Civil War, except the 
Marine Bank which only had a small proportion of Southern securities.50 Since Southern 
securities later declined the most in value, having less Southern securities would be 
advantageous for a free bank. Free banks in Illinois other than Chicago had to endure the 
outbreak of the Civil War and the decline in Southern bond holdings.51 While private banking 
and illegal note issue had started off as being more prominent in Illinois, Chicago and the 
surrounding region remained of commercial importance and free banknotes would come to be 
used as a currency in Chicago instead. 
                                                          
45
 Ibid. pg. 32 
46
 Ibid. pg. 25 
47
 Ibid. pg. 25 
48
 Ibid. pg. 39 
49
 Ibid. pg. 40 
50
 Ibid. pg. 46 
51
 Ibid. pg. 46 
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2.4 The Panic of 1857 and the 1857 and 1861 Amendments 
After the legislature responded to the competition of illegal CD issue, it also sought to 
limit the issue of notes as well as making wildcat banking more difficult. Amendments passed in 
February of 1857 also served to respond to developments in finance and banking. All state bonds 
and U.S. treasuries, including Illinois, were required to be valued for purposes of note issuance at 
90% of their market value, rather than the previous valuation of 80% of market value for Illinois 
bonds and 100% of market value for all other state bonds and U.S. treasuries, with the amount 
received not exceeding the bonds’ par values.52 The haircut on note issuance for Illinois bonds 
was reduced since the state was considered to have improved its creditworthiness since the free 
banking law was initially passed in 1851.53 A tax was also introduced on the bond deposits held 
by the Illinois free banks equal to the then-tax on real estate in Illinois.54 In a provision that 
sought to decrease the potential of wildcat banks to be established in remote locations in Illinois 
so that note redemption would be difficult, banks were now required to be in a city or town with 
a population of 200 or more.55 The usury provisions of the free banking laws were also modified 
so that 10% interest would be the maximum that could be demanded of or received by a free 
bank.  
 The 1857 amendments to the Illinois free banking law were instituted prior to the Panic 
of 1857, a steep decline in financial markets, later that year. Federal and state bonds were traded, 
but the trading of railroad securities expanded in the decade prior to the Panic and they were the 
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 General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 20
th
 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker, 
Printers, 1857), pg. 24 
53









primary private securities that traded.56 Increased speculation in railroad securities up until 1857 
followed by a decline in optimism in 1857 is one of the causes of the Panic.57 The newspaper 
The Ottawa Free Trader commented that, despite the Panic of 1857, confidence remained in 
state bonds in the long run since it was believed that states whose bonds declined were solvent.58 
The “bears of Wall Street” were instead blamed for the Panic and the subsequent decline in value 
for state securities, effectively assessing an increased liquidity risk versus the increased default 
risk that emerged as the Civil War started.59 The view that financial panics were seen as 
transitory even during them is noteworthy, since banks would want to stay in business if they 
believed a recovery in security prices would happen eventually. When war was looming, banks 
would not desire to meet calls on their note issues by depositing additional securities or 
redeeming holders of banknotes, since the decline in their bond portfolio was a longer term 
problem and the bond prices would have already declined substantially. 
 New York bank loans peaked in August 1857 and declined to their lowest levels during 
the Panic by December 1857.60 The contracting of loans and move into liquid positions of gold 
by New York banks was criticized at the time by Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and later J.S. 
Gibbons for causing the Panic.61 Gibbons noted that the New York country banks that withdrew 
deposits from the New York City banks were to blame for the contracting of loans by those city 
banks, however.62 Until late August, the New York money market was functioning normally, but 
                                                          
56
 Charles W. Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, “The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment”,  
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 4: (Dec. 1991) pg. 809 
57
 Ibid. pg. 811 
58




 J.S. Gibson, The Banks of New York, Their Dealers, The Clearinghouse, and the Panic of 1857 (New York: D. 
Appleton and Co., 1858), pg. 348. 
61





it began to enter panic at the end of the month.63 The greatest decline in bond and stock prices in 
New York took place from August 22 to October 1.64 While loan collection was becoming very 
difficult, banks decided to call their loans back and along with redemption requests from country 
banks and depositors led to the suspension of specie payments in New York City on October 14, 
1857.65 
 As the Panic of 1857 spread to Chicago by September, there were consequences for the 
local financial system. There was a contraction in the money market in Chicago, as well as high 
demand for gold specie, and a limited amount of banknotes from the east were available.66 
Illinois and Wisconsin banknotes were widely available in Illinois, but Chicago merchants had 
problems exchanging these banknotes for other currencies and therefore could not pay their 
eastern debts.67 This diminished trade in general in Illinois, since farmers, merchants, and others 
had problems paying their bills in general.68 Although, before the Panic, Illinois banknotes had 
served as half of the currency in circulation overall in Missouri their use ceased in St. Louis as 
the Panic spread.69 Since the declining Missouri bonds were a large portion of the Illinois bond 
portfolios, Missouri was effectively harming their own bond market by refusing to use Illinois 
banknotes and they soon resumed their usage.70 By October 17, 1857, there was a bank run on 
                                                          
63
 Gibson, The Banks of New York. pg. 353. 
64
 Ibid. pg. 358 
65
 Ibid. pg. 360 and “The Crisis at Last,” New York Times, October 14, 1857. 
66
 “The Bank Flurry,” Ottawa Free Trader, September 5, 1857. 
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 “Illinois Banks in St. Louis,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 10, 1857. 
70
 Ibid. 
This topic is discussed further in "Banks Distance from Missouri" 
Clayman 16 
 
the Bank of Missouri, the only bank in Missouri legally allowed to issue currency until that same 
year.71  
 Additional amendments to the free banking law were passed by the Illinois legislature in 
February of 1861. These amendments allowed only Illinois and U.S. bonds to be held as security 
for note issuance by free banks that were starting operations, with preexisting free banks being 
able to maintain other states’ bonds as collateral for their note issue.72 This was a response to the 
decline in other states’ bond prices as the U.S. Civil War was about to start, as it was thought that 
free banks would be able to meet redemption more easily if they had less risky bonds.73 The 
amount of notes that could be issued was also increased to the total par value of the bonds.74 The 
amount of capital required for a new free bank to enter into operations was decreased from 
$50,000 to $25,000.75 The amendments also mandated that new free banks had to be located in 
towns or cities with a population of 1,000 or more, increased from the 200 population 
requirement in the 1857 amendments.76 The only free bank at that point still in Chicago was the 
Marine Bank, however, which had reduced its circulation to $50,000 by the time of the 
amendment’s passage.77 
2.5. Periods of Free Bank Failures in Illinois 
Economopoulos (1988) found three periods of price declines used as a proxy for 
Tennessee bonds, during which most the Illinois free banks failed, during the period from 1851 
                                                          
71
  “Progress of the Bank Panic,” Ottawa Free Trader, October 17, 1857 and Mark Geiger. “Yale Series in Economic 
and Financial History “: Chapter 2 “New Banks” 
72
 General Laws of the State of Illinois: Passed by the 22
nd
 General Assembly. (Springfield: Lanphier & Walker, 
Printers, 1861), pg. 39 
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 General Assembly. pg. 46 
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 Charlton, The History of Banking in Illinois Since 1863, pg. 47. 
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to 1863. The first period was from March 1854 to December 1854, the second period included 
the Panic of 1857 during the period from June 1857 to October 1857, and the third period was 
from June 1860 to June 1861.78 Two of the Illinois failures occurred in 1857, when the banks 
failed to meet requests to deposit additional securities, and 89 failed during the June 1860 to June 
1861 decline.79 During the last price decline, the banking commissioners at times asked 
noteholders to receive bonds instead of gold to prevent a precipitous decline further in bond 
prices.80 
3. Integration of United States Financial Markets 
 As the Panic of 1857 demonstrated, changes in New York City financial markets spread 
throughout the country, resulting in specie payment suspension. Financial integration would also 
allow banks in Illinois to recognize and react to changes in bond prices in New York City. It is 
important to note, however, that financial integration of the United States was already 
established prior to 1857. Greater technological capacity emerged in the early 19th century and 
progressed throughout the 19th century, with information transmitted through the telegraph and 
the financial press and goods moved on railroads.81 The increased speed of information and 
goods flow allowed financial funding to move throughout the United States geographically and 
into emerging industries more quickly.82 Regional interest rate differences then decreased and 
U.S. financial markets became integrated as the 19th century progressed. Lance Davis found in a 
study that, by the middle of the 19th century or earlier, interest rates were equal throughout most 
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 Ibid. 262-263 
81
 Howard Bodenhorn, A History of Banking in Antebellum America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,  
2000), pg. 85. 
82
 Ibid. pg. 86. 
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the United States.83 Research by Bowdenhorn (2000) also found that interest rates84 within the 
frontier of the U.S. were close to and correlated with those of New York City based on 
intermittent data in the 1820s and consistent data after the mid-1830s.85 
 U.S. financial markets were integrated by the time free banking started in Illinois, so free 
banks were able to engage in portfolio rebalancing based on bond price changes and their 
effectiveness in doing so can be assessed. If updated information on bonds and other financial 
products in New York was known by the Illinois free banks, there would be enough information 
for a free bank to engage in efficient financial practices such as diversification and to compare 
the risk return profile between the different securities in the asset class of U.S. and state bonds. 
These banks would also be knowledgeable about how particular bonds’ prices reacted during 
previous declines in the bond market during financial panics. They would therefore be able to 
determine which bonds were safer and could increase their security allocation to those bonds that 
were less risky so they could survive financial turmoil. Using financial measures such as value-
at-risk and the Sharpe ratio allows banks’ behavior to be quantified and their actions can be 
compared to the information publically available to free banks at any given point in time. 
While private bankers during this period lent to the manufacturing, farming, and 
merchant communities, they were not that well known in the financial centers of New York and 
London.86 However, corresponding banking between private banks and exchange brokers 
enabled the discounting of bills of exchange and promissory notes and the brokering of state 
                                                          
83
 Ibid. pg. 122. 
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 Interest rates were calculated by taking the loan income divided by the average volume of loans outstanding, 
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banknotes, which helped integrate regional financial markets.87 Corresponding bankers in cities 
were also involved in discounting and purchasing government and corporate securities.88 Loans 
initiated by country banks of balances held by city correspondents and the discounting of bills in 
rural areas with eastern correspondents were also important factors in the integration of financial 
markets prior to the Civil War.89 Thus, free banks had access to corresponding relationships with 
other banks to make portfolio changes through transactions in New York and knowledge of 
interest rate developments and free banks’ financial conditions was also available. 
 In contrast to the Panic of 1837, when regional financial markets had collapsed, during 
the Panic of 1847 and Panic of 1857 the markets did not disintegrate.90 Improvements in 
communication using the telegraph, as well as coordination among banks’ Southern branches not 
only allowed for the market to survive, but also for changes in interest rates to spread across the 
country.91 When interest rates on commercial paper were 10% in New Orleans, it only took 4 
weeks for the contagion to spread from Wall Street and rates to rise to 24-36% in New Orleans.92 
Although financial markets were more likely to continue functioning during crises, the 
integration of financial markets made it more likely for a rise of interest rates in one region to 
spread throughout the country. 
4. Usury Laws 
 The integration of the financial market by this period in time clashed with state 
regulations, in particular the usury laws. When prevailing market interest rates exceed the usury 
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ceiling, banks face a portfolio decision: they could charge a rate above the ceiling, either 6 or 
7%, and face a lawsuit or they could find alternative ways to extend credit. Law suits, however, 
were unlikely in rural areas. The government was not continuing to monitor the interest rates that 
banks were charging. Instead, bank clients had to make a complaint that the state’s usury laws 
were being violated.93 Since customers desired to maintain business with the bank, they were 
unlikely to report the bank for fear that the bank would no longer do business with them.94 In a 
small town environment, other banks would also likely avoid doing business with someone who 
reported another bank for violation of usury laws.95 
 In larger cities, significant portfolio adjustments and alternative relationships were made 
by banks. Bodenhorn (2007) found that the primary effect of usury restrictions on banks in New 
York during the 19th century was less credit availability for high risk borrowers if the interest 
rate rose much higher than the usury rate. Bowdenhorn also found that usury rates were not 
completely followed, but that the relationship between banks and their clients were of greater 
importance. Benmelech, et al. (2008) found that usury did negatively impact the ability of 
financial institutions to lend in general; however, usury laws loosened as interest rates rose and 
this helped reduce their impact. Since bankers in New York were able to avoid usury, it is 
possible Illinois free banks may have also employed those methods, but there are other known 
ways that they did this. Usury laws applied to the free banks and not private bankers so free 
banks were able to avoid the usury laws by lending banknotes to associated private banks that 
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made loans rates higher than the usury rate.96 The purchase of commercial paper was another 
method that banks used to avoid the usury rate, as interest rates on such paper were often double 
the usury rate.97 Banks could also force customers who take out loans to maintain compensating 
balances, which would force them to deposit money with the bank for a few days before 
withdraw, effectively increasing the interest rate beyond the usury rate.98  
5. Modeling of Risk and Return 
 Usury laws, even with avoidance, likely influenced the portfolio allocation decisions of 
banks and therefore contributed to their portfolio allocations and whether they met a particular 
risk-return profile. For antebellum banks, the portfolio allocation decision was not only 
constrained by the usury laws, they also face the bond collateral provision of banknotes. Recent 
researchers, Economopoulos (1988), Rolnick and Weber (1984), and others, have found that the 
decline in state bond prices, Southern bonds in particular, led to most of the bank closures and 
failures of free banks in Illinois. Public information about the bond portfolios of the banks, 
coupled with the general understanding of the bond backing structure of banknotes, presented 
antebellum bank managers with a risk-return decision. Furthermore, the call provision in the law 
did not give bank managers flexibility during periods of bond price decline which could trigger a 
demand on specie. Thus, the bond portfolio choice not only included the risk associated with the 
bonds themselves, but also redemption, or liquidity, risk. 
Given the uncertainty of the value of the bond collateral, the public’s reaction to bond 
prices could force banks into liquidation, even though they were solvent. Consequently, Rolnick 
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and Weber and Economopoulos categorized banks leaving the market as “closed” or “failed.” 
Closed banks are banks that stopped operating, but that were able to repay their noteholders in 
full and therefore were able to manage their portfolios properly, but a problem with liquidity 
resulted when a decline in bond prices led the Illinois Auditor to shut down the bank.99 Failed 
banks are banks that stopped operating, but banks failed to redeem their noteholders for the full 
value of their notes from the holdings of the bonds that they deposited with the Illinois 
Auditor.100 
Although recognizing the cause of the banks leaving the market ex post is important, 
analysis of free banks’ ex ante decision making should help determine whether the banks were 
taking undue risk. If banks were taking greater risk, the downturn in prices would result in those 
banks failing and unable to repay their noteholders. If banks were more aware of the risk, the 
downturn in prices would have resulted in banks closing, and paying off their noteholders in full. 
The differences in ex ante bond security allocation between closed and failed banks was 
previously examined by Dwyer and Hafer (2003) who used the efficient frontier to find 
differences in portfolio allocations, with the banks that failed taking greater risk per unit of return 
than those that survived. While this analysis will examine the Sharpe ratio as a risk-return metric 
rather than the efficient frontier, it will also use the financial model of value at risk to determine 
whether banks’ bond assets were more susceptible to decline during a market downturn.  
Diversification allows for financial institutions to reduce their risk due to differences in 
correlation for the assets that they hold, while seeking to maintain as high of a return per unit of 
risk as possible. The ability of the free bank to choose the security allocation of its bond portfolio 
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enables it to manage according to the principles of diversification. A banker who purchases only 
one kind of bond is facing all the risk associated with the bond and issuer. The risk is measured 
by the asset’s standard deviation. If any particular bank was to divide its investment by 
purchasing two different bonds, the risk associated with the portfolio is based on the relationship 
between the bond returns. If the bond returns are perfectly negatively correlated, so that the bond 
increases in value by the exact same percentage as the other decreases, the value of the portfolio 
would not change as the bond prices move. If the bond returns are perfectly positively correlated, 
the value of the portfolio would increase or decrease by the amount both bonds increase or 
decrease. Thus, the risk of the bond portfolio depends on price correlations among the bonds and 
the weightings of each bond in the portfolio. The market, expecting to be compensated for the 
risk, would price the securities based on their relative risk to the portfolio.  
5.1. Value at Risk 
 Value at risk (VaR) is a financial measure that helps to measure the potential loss in 
worst-case scenarios for a portfolio of securities.101 For instance, a measure of 1% VaR102 for 
daily returns would find the minimum decline in the value of the portfolio that would occur 1 out 
of every 100 observations, while 99 out of every 100 observations would have a decline less than 
that figure, would be unchanged or have a gain.103 5% and 1% VaR are the standard measures 
that are used in the financial industry.104 For bonds, VaR can be determined using either price 
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data or yield data. For this study, price VaR will be used since bond prices are critical to a free 
bank's liquidity risk.105  
 The usage of VaR to assess the risk of banks’ bond portfolios is important since it can 
help determine the amount of risk that could be determined ex ante by Illinois free banks prior to 
the developments of the Civil War. While some previous studies have alleged that wildcat 
banking was the main cause of noteholder losses, it is important to look at the change in price of 
bank assets instead if the cause was the decline in bond prices rather than the fraud of wildcat 
bankers. The anticipation of the Civil War itself drove the prices down for fear of the ability of 
states to pay back their debts. For this reason, value at risk should be a useful measure of how 
banks could have perceived their ability to survive a substantial downturn in the prices of bonds. 
While the financial measure of value at risk did not become a prominent measure to calculate 
riskiness of a portfolio of securities until 1994106, it should demonstrate the quantity in losses that 
banks should have perceived as likely during market downturns. Therefore, it should serve as an 
effective measure of losses even during a low probability market destabilizing event. 
By using VaR, it can assess the risk associated with a particular bond portfolio and help 
examine questions about the banks’ decision making. Since the Illinois Auditor could make calls 
for additional bonds or notes if the value of the bonds deposited drops below the threshold, the 
VaR would be an excellent measure to assess the likelihood of a call. Any "public" call by the 
Auditor would be a significant signal to the public about the bank's liquidity risk or default 
risk.107 For the free bankers, they would be concerned with both the liquidity risk and default risk 
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of their bond holdings, but if the public believes that the bank will default on their redemption 
promise, it could lead to liquidity risk with their failure to meet redemption. 
Given the greater uncertainty in the market due to tensions emerging among the U.S. 
states, two hypotheses are examined. 
 Hypothesis #1: As the Civil War became more likely, banks adjusted their bond portfolio 
for the increased risk by holding lower VaR portfolios between 1858 and 1860. 
 Hypothesis #2: As the Civil War became more likely, VaRs are likely to be higher in 
banks holding a higher percentage of Southern bonds. 
5.2. Sharpe Ratio 
The risk as measured by the VaR would suggest greater exposure, but individual bankers 
may be willing to accept such risk if they were compensated for it. The Sharpe ratio will be used 
to help determine the efficacy of the decision-making of the Illinois Free Banks regarding their 
bond portfolios. In order to measure the tradeoff between risk and return, the formula used for 
the Sharpe Ratio in the analysis is as follows: 
 SR = 1 Month Holding Period Return - Risk Free Return 
   Standard Deviation of 1 Month HPR 
 
 It will demonstrate whether Illinois free banks were taking appropriate risk given the 
expected return per standard deviation of its bond holdings. Gold specie with no return will be 
counted as the risk free asset, since the noteholders of the Illinois free banks had to be redeemed 
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in gold specie. Therefore, the excess return will be the same as the actual one month holding 
period return for each free bank's portfolio. 
Hypothesis #3: Banks' Sharpe ratios are likely to be negatively correlated with the                            
 bank's VaR 
 There are a number of caveats that impact both the usage of VaR and Sharpe ratios. 
Although VaR will capture the price risk associated with the bond portfolio, it does not capture 
the total price risk of the bank. Consequently, there are a few potential reasons that free banks 
would be willing to hold portfolios with relatively high VaRs. First, the free bank had the ability 
to offset a potential decline in their bond portfolio through their security allocations among their 
non-bond assets. They could manage their loan portfolio by holding more short-term and liquid 
loans, higher gold specie reserves, or not circulate the maximum amount of notes that they could 
issue legally. Second, a VaR may appear high, but not high enough that it would trigger a call by 
the auditor, requiring note redemption or the deposit of additional bonds by the free bank. Under 
those circumstances, free banks would not need to be as cautious. 
 Third, the potential of a large decline in the value of a bond portfolio in a short period 
would also be less impactful if it was thought to be transitory. For instance, the Panic of 1857 
was a relatively short-term liquidity risk in a financial panic and some states stepped in to protect 
banks by suspending specie payments until markets returned to normal, but the 1860-61 bond 
price decline was different since the default risk of bonds became highly probable.108 The degree 
to which free banks would have recognized the permanence of the decline and the timing of this 
recognition is important, since banks would be more likely to adjust in response to increased 
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default risk. Fourth, VaR risk generally measures the historical risk at the current evaluation of 
the bond portfolio. However, for the free banker, the risk that it faces is evaluated at the book 
value of the portfolio. Banks would need to deposit additional securities or redeem notes if their 
notes outstanding did not have sufficient collateral. If a bank’s bonds had already appreciated or 
depreciated since banknotes were issued, the book value on a bank’s balance sheet may not 
accurately show the value of losses and risk of a call that a bank could face. 
Fifth, the geographic location of a bank could lead to a different security allocation for 
more intangible reasons, such as a bank wanting to generate good will in a neighboring state 
where they do business. For instance, a greater purchase of Missouri state bonds for free banks in 
Illinois that are closer to the Missouri border could therefore be an efficient allocation of 
resources for that particular even if its Sharpe ratio is lower. 
Finally, individual free banks could have lower risk based on their asset allocation to gold 
specie reserves and loans. If a bank held greater specie reserves, that bank would be more able to 
satisfy net demand for gold specie on any given day and therefore a decline in their bond 
portfolio would be less likely to compromise their ability to redeem noteholders. Banks 
apparently deviating from the frontier by taking greater risk for an expected return could be 
holding greater specie reserves to compensate for greater risk in their bond portfolio. Greater 
asset allocation to loans could be another way that free banks could offset greater standard 
deviation in their bond portfolio, as the loans made by the bank could be relatively low risk loans 
and they also allow for greater asset diversification in the bank’s portfolio. The loans would also 
be a shorter term asset versus bond holdings, allowing a free bank to meet redemption for 




Hypothesis #4: Free banks' were able to offset their risky bond holdings with greater 
holdings of safer non-bond assets, such as loans, or by issuing less than the maximum amount of 
banknotes allowed by law 
Hypothesis #5: The closer a bank was to a neighboring state, such as Missouri, the more 
likely they are willing to hold their bonds. 
5.3. Monthly Net Bond Flows 
 Finally, although the previous measures of risk can determine ex ante risks, they are 
based on historical information. Changes in the current market and expected market are not fully 
captured by these measures. To capture expectations of bankers, we can examine the changes in 
bond flows. Correlations can be calculated based on what any particular state's bond was 
yielding in a particular month with the net bond flows; that is subtracting bond outflows from 
any bond inflows. This is another way of determining whether the bankers were responding to 
any increased risk or they continued to pursue yield. Given the tensions emerging among the 
U.S. states, another hypothesis is examined: 
Hypothesis #6: Free banks purchased lower yielding, lower risk bonds during any 
particular month, after the nomination of Lincoln in May of 1860. 
6. Data and Analysis 
Data was gathered from several sources and are given in Table 1. Dwyer, et al. included 
weekly prices of Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and Virginia state bonds from October 1856 to October 1860. Additional information 
from Bankers’ Magazine (1856) included limited information on the prices of Illinois state 
bonds, primarily twice monthly updates in prices during 1855 and was also used for the value at 
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risk calculation. The bond price data from Dwyer, et al. was generally available weekly during 
the March 1855 to October 1860 period. When data from one week was not available, that 
respective week was omitted from the calculation of standard deviation, correlation coefficient, 
and ultimately value at risk. 
Table 1: Bond Price Data during the Antebellum Period of Bonds Held by the Illinois Banks 
Source Period Bonds Availability 




GA, KY, LA, MO, NC, 
OH, VA, TN, US 











GA, KY, LA, MO, NC, 
OH, TN, IL47, NY 
IL47, NY: Consistent data 1856-1859 
Others: Consistent, filled missing 
observations from Dwyer, et al. series 




SC, MI, MN, IA, IL6 IL6: 2 years, MI: Over 1 year 
MN, IA: Less than 1 year 
SC: Scattered for  few months at a time  
Sources: Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., et al. Weekly U.S. and State Bond Prices. Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=264.  J. Smith Homans , ed. The Bankers’ Magazine and 
Statistical Registrar. Vol. 13 (Vol. 8 New Series) 1858-1859.  Henry Poor, ed. American Railroad 
Journal. Vol. 29-32: New York: J.H. Schultz, 1856-1859. Richard E. Sylla, Jack Wilson, and Robert E. 
Wright. "Price Quotations in Early U.S. Securities Markets, 1790-1860." Economic History Association. 
http://eh.net/database/early-u-s-securities-prices/ 
 
In addition to the existing data that I have consolidated from other sources, I have also 
found additional sources of information in archives of the American Railroad Journal. While the 
Railroad Journal primarily listed the prices of railroad securities, there were also prices of U.S. 
and state securities from around 1855 to 1861. This additional information helped to fill gaps 
within the data of the existing sources and allowed for the continuity of prices that was needed in 
order to have reliable figures for changes in prices from week to week. 
For the overall VaR calculation, a normal distribution of returns was assumed and the 1% 
VaRs were calculated using a z-score. Some correlations between the bond price movements of 
different states were not available, generally in states that had limited holdings such as Iowa, 
Michigan, and Minnesota where there was limited availability of bond price data. Some 
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correlations, price movements, and holding period return movements were also omitted where 
certain bonds had limited availability of price data, such as bonds issued for canals, South 
Carolina bonds, and alternate bond issues by Illinois. 
Where information on state securities was still intermittent between different weeks, 
however, a graduation of prices was used to fill the weekly gaps in prices so that correlations and 
price changes for different states’ bond prices could be found. Finally, in some cases bond prices 
did not overlap for a limited number of periods. For correlation analysis, if there was missing 
information that was needed to find a correlation: two types of bond price proxies were 
calculated. One proxy was the multiplication of common correlations. For instance, there was no 
pricing data for Michigan during one of the two year periods being examined, and a correlation 
between Illinois 6s and Michigan could not be computed. Correlations could be calculated 
between Illinois 6s and South Carolina, and South Carolina and Michigan. Thus a proxy for the 
correlation between Illinois and Michigan was computed by their multiplication. A second proxy 
was the substitution of a correlation that most reflected the two bonds. Missing data on some of 
the Illinois bonds prevented correlation calculation. Data was available for two similar bonds in 
New York and their correlations were used. A simple average of the prices of the two other 
Illinois state securities was used as a proxy for an Illinois bond issue, the Interest 1860 bond, 
since default risk was likely similar to the other Illinois bond issues and correlations should have 
been similar. Additionally, for correlation analysis, if there was missing information that was 
needed to find a correlation in bond prices. The information for the vast majority of bonds was 
available, however, and for the ones where the pricing data was scarce only represented a small 
fraction of the Illinois banks’ portfolios. 
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Data for monthly net bond flows was gathered from the Auditor's ledgers on bond 
registrations. In these ledgers, the date, state, and the amount in par value of the bond was 
recorded. The ledger also included the date that the bonds were withdrawn. These ledgers were 
the basis of the free banks' annual reports to the legislature. Using the annual report of October 
of 1858 and calculating monthly totals for all of the free banks during the November 1858 to 
October 1860 period, a monthly portfolio can be calculated and a net flow of bonds by the 
banking system as a whole in each month can also be determined.109 
6.1 Bond Portfolios 
 The bond portfolios of the Illinois banks were composed of a variety of state and U.S. 
bonds that could be used as collateral for their issue of banknotes. The following table represents 
an overall summary of the bond holdings of the Illinois free banks in November of 1858 and 
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Table 2: Composition of the Illinois Free Bank Portfolios 
State/Country Percent in 11/1858 Percent in 11/1860 
Virginia 11.61% 9.1% 
Georgia 1.2% 2.3% 
Missouri 49.5% 24.2% 
Ohio 2.9% 2.1% 
Kentucky 0.2% 0.4% 
Louisiana 5.5% 3.7% 
North Carolina 4.2% 6.13% 
South Carolina 1.5% 0.7% 
Tennessee 10.3% 22.8% 
Illinois 10% 15.9% 
Iowa 1.3% 0.7% 
Michigan 1.8% 3.7% 
Minnesota 0.1% 1.0% 
New York 0% 2.06% 
U.S. 0% 5.2% 
 
 By analyzing the changes in price of these bond issues over time, as well as the amount 
of holdings each bank had in each bond, the amount of any given bank's bond portfolio at risk 
based on its price history and correlation scan be calculated. Additionally, the amount of return 
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for every unit of risk, using the standard deviation as a measure of risk, can be calculated, which 
can also be used to compare between banks and time periods. 
6.2. Value at Risk 
The empirical analysis below will compare the VaR for a particular bank and the 
composition of their bond portfolio. Hypothesis #1 suggests that banks in Illinois will adjust their 
portfolios such that they would reduce their VaR as they approached the Civil War, and 
hypothesis #2 suggests that banks holding a high allocation of Southern bonds and did not have 
high VaR figures, they were ex ante diversified. If the high VaRs are associated with a high 
allocation of southern bonds, it indicates they were not ex ante diversified. These banks, 
however, may have been able to offset this risk in other parts of their balance sheet, based on 
their allocation to loans, specie, and what percentage of notes they were issuing from bond 
holdings. Banks with portfolios that had low VaRs may have increased their risk in other parts of 
their balance sheet; however, so those factors should be evaluated for these banks as well. 
The 1858 value at risk for Illinois free banks’ bond portfolios was calculated based on the 
banks’ holdings in November of 1858 and the weekly changes in the bonds’ prices during the 
approximately two year period from October 31, 1856 to October 29, 1858. The 1860 value at 
risk for Illinois free banks’ bond portfolios was calculated based on the banks’ holdings in 
November of 1860 and the weekly changes in the bonds’ prices during the approximately two 
year period from November 5, 1858 to October 26, 1860. This allows for a similar period of 
price changes in order to compare the two periods. The 1856 to 1858 period includes the Panic of 
1857, showing what bank managers could have expected their potential losses to be in the event 
of a rapid decline in prices. After evaluating changes in prices during declines, including 
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financial panics and political risk events, it can serve as a quantitative measure of how managers 
should have viewed the riskiness in their portfolios. While the 1858 to 1860 period does not 
include a period of financial panic, it shows changes that banks made with their portfolio over 
time that changed their risk relative to the market. It will also demonstrate whether the 
composition of their portfolio changed their value at risk over time. For the VaRs in 1860, the 
Illinois free banks also divided into banks that were already in existence in November of 1858, 
or "old" banks, and those banks that entered between November of 1858 and November of 1860, 
or "new" banks. 
The first VaR measure is based on the total portfolio of bonds hled by the Auditor. This 
would represent the total risk of the Illinois free banking system. (See Chart 1.) 
Chart 1: VaR for the 1858 and 1860 Total Market Bond Portfolios 
 
The VaR for the total bond market portfolio in 1858 was 12.46% and was almost three 
times greater than the VaR of 4.31% in 1860. The significance of this difference is that a one out 














the 1858 portfolio while there would have to be over two back to back events in the later period. 
This would appear to confirm the hypothesis that banks made adjustments between 1858 and 
1860 to lower their VaR. This significant difference is not surprising since the period between 
1858 and 1860 was one of relative calm, while the period proceeding, however, included the 
panic of 1857 that had already ended by November of 1858. There are other factors that must be 
considered, however, including distinctions between the new and old banks as well as whether it 
was the difference in price changes during the 1856-1858 period versus the 1858-1860 period 
that contributed to the decrease in VaR. The analysis of those other factors is examined further 
by examining the portfolios between old and new banks. 
Charts 2 and 3: Average VaR and Southern Allocation Differences Between New and Old 
Banks in 1860 
  
 As Chart 2 shows, the average 1860 value at risk for old banks was 5.58% versus 4.53% 
for new banks. For the purpose of this analysis, Southern states include Virginia, Georgia, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri. The average percentage 
holdings of Southern bonds in 1860 for new banks was 60.98% versus 77.66% for banks that had 
already been in existence. This indicates that new banks were tending to allocate less toward 


























6.3. Value at Risk, Year of Bank Entry, and Southern Bond Holdings 
 Since old banks had both greater Southern bond holdings and value-at-risk, comparing 
the value-at-risk for each free bank with its holdings of Southern bonds could help show how 
much a bank's Southern bond holdings contributed to an increased price risk for each bank. The 
correlation coefficient between each bank's value-at-risk in 1860 and the percent of their 
Southern bond holdings was 0.54, with a slightly stronger correlation for new banks than old 
banks. Since the correlations for the old and new banks were slightly different, including whether 
a bank was new and old can show whether when a bank entered the market also contributed to 
the banking system's value-at-risk. A regression was run with the 1860 VaR of each bank as the 
dependent variable and a dummy variable indicating whether it is a net or old bank, and the 
percent of Southern bonds as the independent variable. The results were as follows: 
Dependent Variable:     V  = Value at risk of the free bank in 1860  
Independent Variables:   Y =  Dummy variable for old and new banks 
   ("old" around by 1858 = 0,  "new" around by 1860 = 1) 
       S  =  Percentage holdings of Southern bonds in 1860 
V =   4.283 - 0.77Y +0.01667S 
                                                         t   =  16.05  -3.818   5.85         
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = 36.78% Observations = 106 
 The results indicate that when any bank, new or old, held an increased proportion of 
Southern bonds in its portfolio, an increased value at risk is also indicated. A portfolio of 100% 
southern bonds would increase the bank's VaR by 1.66 or about an increase of 39% over a bank 
with no Southern bonds. Furthermore old banks selected a portfolio with a higher VaR than 
newer banks holding the percent of Southern bonds constant. An old bank on average held a 
portfolio with a VaR that was 0.77% higher than a new bank. Although this is statistically 
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significant, it is not practically significant. 36.78% of the change in banks' value-at-risk was 
explained by the independent variables, with a bank's holdings of Southern bonds being a 
stronger association than whether a bank was new or old, although both factors are significant. 
 There was a significant drop in VaR among the banks from 1858 to 1860. However, this 
could have been due to the general calm in the market and not any active management on the 
part of bankers. The VaR for the total market portfolio of all the free banks in 1858 was 12.46%, 
indicating that 1% of the time that the total market portfolio would lose that much percent in a 
week. To determine if banks' choices increased or decreased risk over the period, a VaR 
benchmark for the 1860 analysis was created using the portfolio weights of the total market 
portfolio of 1858. Thus, any change in the benchmark would be due to pure price changes and 
not portfolio adjustments. Comparing the results showed that the benchmark VaR dropped from 
12.46% (blue) to 5.09% (red) in 1860. The drop showed a strong calming of the market as the 
VaR value decreased greatly. Additionally, an old bank total portfolio VaR using the portfolio 
weights of all of the old banks based on their holdings in 1860 was created. Weighting the total 
portfolio of the old banks based on their holdings in 1860 allows their results to be compared 
more directly to the 1858 benchmark VaR. The old banks VaR in 1860 dropped to 5.00% 







Chart 4: Average VaR Based On Total Market Portfolios in 1858 and 1860 
 
 While the difference between the benchmark and actual allocation of the old banks were 
small, it suggests that there was some activity that adjusted the weights in their portfolio. New 
banks that entered over the 1858-1860 period are also included in the VaR for the total market 
portfolio, which shows a drop in the overall system-wide risk to 4.69% (purple). This implies 
that the new banks reduced their risk more than the old banks did during the same period. It 
would appear that the old banks were taking more risk with their portfolios than the new banks. 
Looking at whether banks were adequately awarded for taking greater risk can help show 
whether they were taking undue risk. 
6.4. Sharpe Ratio 
 The risk exposure of the free bank appears to be relatively high in 1858 and much less so 
in 1860. Without regulations, banks can choose to accept risk if there is sufficient compensation. 
























November 1858 and November 1860 analysis can be found in the Data Appendix. Comparison 
and analysis of the Sharpe ratio results in both 1858 and 1860 are included in this section. 
Chart 5: Sharpe Ratios Based On 1858 and 1860 Total Market Portfolios 
 
 Overall, the Sharpe ratio for the Illinois free banks was higher for the total market 
portfolio in 1858 at 66.1% (blue) than it was in 1860 at 24.7% (red). This indicates that the bond 
portfolios overall were receiving greater return per unit of risk during the 1856-1858 period 
versus the 1858-1860 period. However, if the weights of the 1858 portfolio are used to calculate 
the Sharpe ratio in 1860, the ratio falls to 20.7% (green). Thus, the banks appeared to have 
underperformed the total market in 1860 if they kept the same weights that they had in 1858. 
Since the old banks also had the greater value-at-risk in 1860, during the same period of time, 
when compared directly with the new banks during the same time period, they appear to have 
been taking greater risk. To test whether the market Sharpe ratio decline is influenced by new 
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 Using the Sharpe ratio as the dependent variable and the year is set to 0 for old and 1 for 
new being the independent variable, it can be determined whether old or new banks had a better 
return for every unit of risk. The result of the regression was as follows:  
Dependent Variable: SR = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860  
Independent Variables:   Y =  Dummy variable for old and new banks 
   ("old" around by 1858 = 0,  "new" around by 1860 = 1) 
SR  =   0.345 + 0.066Y  
                                                                 t =     7.07      2.69      
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = 5.63% Observations = 106 
 
` The results indicate that the new banks had a better return for every unit of risk, since an 
new bank is estimated to have a Sharpe ratio of 41.1% versus a 34.5% Sharpe ratio for a old 
bank. Thus, the portfolio allocation and any changes made during the 1858-1860 period were not 
enough for the old banks, as the new banks outperformed them. The adjusted R2  figure indicates 
that a bank being old or new offers some, although fairly low, explanatory power in determining 
whether a bank makes a greater return for every unit of risk. Since new banks had a higher 
Sharpe ratio than the old banks and it was the old banks that had a greater value at risk, this 
indicates that the new banks had both had lower downside risk and had a greater return for every 
unit of risk.  
 Additionally, comparing the average Sharpe ratio of the old banks in 1858 and in 1860 
can be used to show the change in the risk return tradeoff for the banks over time. The average 
Sharpe ratio on average for an old bank with their portfolio in 1860 was 19.45% versus a 67.43% 
Sharpe ratio on average for an old bank with their portfolio in 1858. The decline in the banks' 
Sharpe ratio indicates less return per unit of risk for the banks during the 1860 period. 
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 Tracking how much the 1860 Sharpe ratio of a bank changed based on its allocation to 
Southern bonds can help evaluate the Southern bond allocation of the Illinois free banks further. 
While the old banks had higher VaRs and higher allocation to Southern bonds than the new 
banks in 1860, evaluating whether the free banks received an adequate return for greater 
allocation to Southern bonds is also important. It can also help show whether the correlation 
between increased Southern bond allocation for all the banks in 1860 and greater value at risk is 
also echoed here. The results are as follows: 
Dependent Variable:     SR  = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860  
Independent Variables: SO =  Percent of the free bank's bonds in Southern bonds in 1860 
SR  =   0.3983 - 0.2155SO 
                                                         t =           10.39    -4.35          
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = 14.58%  Observations = 106 
 Although it only explains a portion of the change in banks' Sharpe ratios, the results of 
the equation are significant. A greater allocation to Southern bonds is associated with a decrease 
in the Sharpe ratio, or the banks' risk-return tradeoff. Therefore, banks tended not to receive 
adequate return for every unit of risk if they allocated more into Southern bonds than other state 
or U.S. bonds. Bank managers should have had some aversion toward allocating more of their 
portfolio toward Southern bonds by 1860 if they recognized the lack of reward they were 
receiving by doing so. 
 Since the Sharpe ratio is being used to see if the amount of downside risk a bank was 
taking was offset by greater return per unit of risk, recognizing and accounting differences in the 
calculations for both metrics is important. The Sharpe ratio compares a bank's holding period 
return on its bond portfolio based on the bonds' yields, since a bond coupons would offset a 
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comparable decrease in prices, and changes in price relative to the standard deviation of a bank's 
holding period return. On the other hand, the value-at-risk assesses the amount of downside price 
risk a bank faced without accounting for a bond's yield. VaR is important for the free bank since 
it assesses the immediate nature of a downturn in prices. The average holding period return can 
also be compared to a bank's VaR to see if return was offsetting extreme downside risk instead of 
changes in holding period return as a modified Sharpe ratio. To see if using this method of using 
a modified Sharpe ratio had different results for the results of free banks, a regression was used 
and the results were as follows: 
 Dependent Variable:  SR  = Sharpe ratio of the free bank in 1860  
Independent Variables:          MSR =  Modified Sharpe ratio using VaR as risk measure in 1860 
SR  =   -0.034 - 3.82MSR 
                                                         t =          -2.33    22.89          
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = 83.28%  Observations = 106 
 The modified Sharpe ratio using VaR as the risk measure in the risk-return calculation is 
explained largely by the traditional Sharpe ratio using holding period standard deviation as the 
risk measure. Since the traditional Sharpe ratio incorporates standard deviation based on holding 
period return standard deviations rather than the price standard deviation that is used in the  
calculation of VaR, the benefits of using the modified Sharpe ratio may be offset. While a 
modified Sharpe ratio may be necessary if there was a large divergence between the two 
measures, the traditional Sharpe ratio seems appropriate for the Illinois free banks.   
6.5. Bond Flows From November 1858 to October 1860 
 The nomination of Lincoln as the Republican candidate for President of the United States 
in May have been seen as making Civil War more likely. Since the winner of the Republican 
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special election in October of 1860110 indicated growing likelihood of Lincoln winning the 
presidential election during the next month, any analysis after that point would likely be banks 
mitigating the fallout of the election and subsequent Civil War rather than ex ante decision-
making. Inclusion of the month of November of 1860 would also include some activity after the 
presidential election regardless. Therefore, monthly bond flows are examined during the period 
from November of 1858 up through the month of October of 1860.  
 Hypothesis #7: After May of 1860, the amount of Southern bonds being added by banks 
would be expected to be lower if they wished to reduce political risk. 
Chart 6: Bond Flows During the November 1858 to October 1860 Period 
 
 Given that the allocation of the total market bond portfolio toward Southern bonds was 
84% in 1860, the flows reflect a trend toward increasing allocation toward Northern bonds. This 
may appear to reflect some confirmation of Hypothesis #1 since banks seemed to be trying to 
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reduce their risk over the period. The Southern allocation of the market portfolio of all of the 
banks, while dropping from 84% to 69% in 1860, still was heavily allocated toward risky 
Southern bonds. If banks were decreasing their risk, they did not appear to be doing so 
sufficiently. 
 If political risk of bond prices contributed to the banker's expectations, the flow of bonds 
would show that banks deposited more Northern bonds relative to Southern after May when 
Lincoln became the Republican candidate. Chart 7 shows that the flow of bonds after May for all 
banks and the results of banks during their first month of operations after entering during a 
particular month. 
Chart 7: Bond Flows During the May 1860 to October 1860 Period 
 
 The results indicate that among both banks that were already in operations and those 
beginning operations on any particular month, Southern bonds were being added more heavily 
than Northern bonds from May 1860 to October 1860. Given that, prior to May of 1860, banks 
















believe political risk to be increasing or they overlooked while making allocations to their bond 
portfolio. While it is somewhat lower for banks entering the market on any given month, they 
still favored allocation toward Southern bonds during the period. 
 One reason that the free banks may have been increasing their allocation toward Southern 
bond may have been due to them receiving higher yields during the period during which they 
purchased the bonds. By correlating the net inflows, calculated by subtracting the gross inflows 
and gross outflows during each month, a correlation with each bond's yield can be calculated. 
Taking the average of the correlations for each month results in a correlation of 0.12, which is a 
fairly weak positive correlation. Although some banks may have been purchasing riskier bonds 
for this reason, it does not seem like they were strongly motivated to by it. 
7. Adjustments to Bond Portfolio Risk 
7.1. Holdings of Missouri Bonds by the Free Banks 
 During the Panic of 1857, reports surfaced that the usage of Illinois banknotes declined 
despite the Illinois banks holding large quantities of Missouri state bonds.111 This was despite, 
before the Panic of 1857, Illinois banknotes had been serving as half of the overall currency in 
circulation in Missouri.112 Although in this case Missourians had abandoned their holdings of 
Illinois banknotes, they recognized that their abandonment of the Illinois banknotes resulted in a 
decline in the value of their own state's bonds. This relationship seemed to indicate that there was 
a relationship between the banks and currency in circulation in Illinois and Missouri. Given the 
large decline in the Missouri bonds as the Civil War broke out and those bonds accounting for 
about 32% of the Illinois free banks' bond holdings as of November 1, 1860, there may have 
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been interstate banking relationships that could help explain some of the Illinois free bank 
failures. 
 Of the 94 banks in the Illinois balance sheet data in November of 1860, 77 were 
analyzed, with twelve being excluded due to no information on a municipality's population being 
available, two excluded due to the municipality no longer existing, and three excluded due to 
lack of bond data availability. Due to the possibility the Illinois banks holding more of its 
neighboring state's bonds, the relationship between an Illinois free bank holdings based on the 
distance from the individual free banks in Illinois from St. Louis, Missouri was analyzed. The 
amount of loans held by a free bank divided by its earnings assets was also considered since a 
bank may have chosen to hold more loans to offset the risk of holding the Missouri bonds. The 
results were as follows: 
Dependent Variable: MB = Percent of Missouri bonds held as a portion of bond portfolio 
Independent Variables: D = Distance of the free bank from St. Louis, MO in miles 
   LEA = Percent of loans held by free bank as a portion of earning assets 
  
MB =   0.1977 + 0.00032D+ 0.06779LEA 
                                                 t =     1.73       0.502         0.4075       
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = -0.02144      Observations = 77 
 There was an extremely low amount of explanation for variation in holdings of Missouri 
bonds due to the independent variables. The results indicate that a relationship between the 
amount of Missouri bonds held was not significant due to the distance of the bank from St. Louis 
or the proportion of loans the bank was making. It also indicates that banks would not be more 
likely to hold more loans specifically to offset the risk of holding more Missouri bonds. Other 
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factors or operational indifference on the part of the free bankers could help explain the variation 
in holdings of Missouri bonds. 
7.2. Specie Holdings of the Free Banks 
 Due to the requirement that a free bank be able to repay a noteholder or face the risk of 
the Auditor placing the bank into liquidation, holdings of specie were important for free bank 
liquidity. Other factors that the bank is taking that could potentially increase the overall risk the 
bank faces may have influenced the likelihood of the bank to hold more gold specie on reserve. 
For instance, banks that held a greater proportion of Missouri bonds would seem more likely to 
hold specie to offset the price risk of their bond holdings. Banks with a greater distance from St. 
Louis would also seem more likely to hold less specie since there would be a decline in Missouri 
Additionally, banks located in a city or town would seem more likely to hold specie if that 
municipality had a higher population. Banks that were more isolated would be less likely to face 
an immediate demand for specie due to their physical isolation.  
 Of the 94 banks in the Illinois balance sheet data in November of 1860, 77 were 
analyzed, with twelve being excluded due to no information on a municipality's population being 
available, two excluded due to the municipality no longer existing, and three excluded due to 







Dependent Variable: SBN = Percent gold specie held by the bank as a portion of banknotes 
Independent Variables: D = Distance of the free bank from St. Louis, MO in miles 
   MB = Percent of Missouri bonds held as a portion of bond portfolio 
    P   = Population of the municipality as of the 1860 Census   
 
        SBN =   0.1706 - 0.00068D+ 0.12518MB + 7.42x10
-6
P 
                                          t =       0.959        -0.658         0.6893         1.383 
                                         Adjusted R
2
 = -0.0079      Observations = 77 
 There was an extremely low amount of explanation for percent holdings of gold as a 
portion of banknotes due to distance, Missouri bond holdings, and population of the 
municipality. Given this, it appears that distance from St. Louis and percent holdings of Missouri 
bonds did not impact a free bank's allocation into its holdings of specie reserves. Additionally, 
the population of a municipality did not appear to impact its likelihood to hold greater amounts 
of gold as a percentage of its banknotes. Bank managers did not appear to weigh these other 
factors that could potentially impact likelihood of customers to demand specie for their 
banknotes when determining how much gold specie to hold in reserve. 
8. Conclusions 
The Illinois free banks made adjustments during the period from 1858 to 1860. Although 
the old banks lowered their allocations of Southern bonds, this only helped to reduce their value-
at-risk slightly than if the old banks had held their total portfolio constant from 1858 to 1860. Of 
all the banks in 1860, higher allocations into Southern bonds were associated with lower Sharpe 
ratios. Since holding the 1858 total market portfolio constant also resulted in a lower Sharpe ratio 
than the 1860 total market portfolio, this appears to be consistent during any one period. 
Although the Sharpe ratios were higher overall in 1858, the higher VaR offsets that benefit, with 
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the increased risk of holding Southern bonds closer to 1860 making portfolio adjustments 
necessary in order to reduce risk. Banks only reduced their Southern net flows during the 1858-
1860 period somewhat, so it appears that they were taking undue risk by continuing to hold those 
bonds as part of their portfolio. This also appears true after May of 1860, since Southern bond 
net flows actually increase between then and the Pennsylvania special election as well as the 
presidential election in November. 
Free banks did not offset their greater holdings of Missouri bonds with greater holdings 
of gold specie nor were there indications that proximity to St. Louis, Missouri led to greater 
holdings of Missouri debt. Since Missouri bonds were such a large portion of the free banks' 
portfolio in 1858 and still were large in 1858, standard allocation or indifference to 
disproportionate holdings of one state's bonds appeared to lead to this situation. 
 Although the value at risk is lower for the 1860 total market portfolio versus the 1858 
total market portfolio, this was during a time of relatively low volatility and bank managers 
should have recognized the risk would be higher during events that drive a large asset price 
decline. While financial panics and war are not the same, war actually being worse, the value at 
risk does serve as an important measure given that it should have served as at least a minimum 
estimate of the potential losses the bank could face in one week. Since war would seem to have a 
more permanent, or at least longer impact, the Illinois free banks would be less likely to inject 
more capital into their bank to keep it afloat. Thus, even though there was a longer term impact 
of a civil war versus the shorter effect on financial markets of banking panics, the banks should 
have recognized the sharp collapses in bond prices that could occur based on previous financial 
panics. The various allocations by the Illinois free banks do appear to have an impact on their 
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Table 4: Value-at-Risk for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1860 
 
Bank Value-at-Risk Bank Value-at-Risk
AGRICLTRE BK 4.53 FMRS' BK O/ILL,MTR 5.01
ALISANA BK 5.24 FRANKLIN BK 4.47
ALTON BK 4.99 FRONTIER BK 4.81
AMERICAN BK 2.73 FULTON BK 4.14
AMER EX BK 5.95 GARDEN STATE BK 4.52
BK O/ALBION 2.76 GRAND PRARIE BK 6.54
BK O/ALEDO 4.23 GRAYVILLE BK 6.79
BK O/AMER,CHCGO 7.58 HAMPDEN BK 4.73
BK O/AMER,MT.CARMEL 3.93 HIGHLAND BK 6.45
BK O/AURORA 7.26 HUMBOLDT BK 5.19
BK O/BENTON 5.04 ILL. CENTRAL BK 3.38
BK O/BLMNGTN 4.40 ILL RIVER BK 4.78
BK O/BRKLYN 3.59 ILL ST SCRTY BK 3.58
BK O/CARMI 5.86 ILL STATE BK 5.00
BK O/CHESTER 6.93 INTERNATIONAL BK 2.94
BK O/COMMERCE 4.57 JERSEY COUNTY BK 4.65
BK O/CMMNWLTH 7.47 KANKAKEE BK 4.57
BK O/ELGIN 4.61 KASKASKIA BK 5.00
BK O/FED UNION 6.31 LAFAYETTE BK 6.92
BK O/GALENA 4.00 LAKE MICHIGAN BK 3.75
BK O/GENESEO 5.39 LANCASTER BK 5.26
BK O/ILL,NEW HVN 3.89 MARINE BK 3.58
BK O/INDEMNITY 3.65 MRSHLL CNTY BK 3.65
BK O/JCKSN CNTY 4.00 MCLEAN CNTY BK 5.21
BK O/MTRPLS 4.03 MERCH & DRVRS BK,JLT 5.73
BK O/NAPERVLL 5.45 MERCHANT'S BK,CARMI 3.57
BK O/NRTHRN ILL* 7.58 MISS RIVER BK 4.07
BK O/PERU 6.98 MORGAN CNTY BK 6.88
BK O/PIKE CNTY 4.83 NARRAGANSETT BK 4.41
BK O/QUINCY 7.37 NATIONAL BK 7.13
BK O/RALEIGH 6.72 NEW MARKET BK 5.43
BK O/SO ILL 5.22 OHIO RIVER BK 4.70
BK O/SPARTA 1.95 OLYMPIC BK 3.89
BK O/REPUBLIC 4.63 PAMET BK 6.58
BELVIDERE BK 6.76 PATRIOTIC BK 3.75
BULLS HEAD 3.79 PITTSFIELD BL 2.72
CANAL BK 4.98 PLOWMAN'S BK 5.57
CENTRAL BK 4.68 PRARIE STATE BK 4.82
CHICAGO BK 3.98 RAILROAD BK 4.50
CITIZEN'S BK 7.12 REAPERS BK 4.97
CITY BK,OTTAWA 4.01 REED'S BK 7.58
COLUMBIAN BK 3.64 ROCK ISLAND BK 7.58
COMM BK O/NW HVN 5.32 SHAWANSES BK 4.11
COMM BK/PALSTN 5.43 SO BK O/ILL,GRYVL 5.70
COMM BK,CHCGO 5.25 STATE BK O/ILL 4.18
CONTINENTAL BK 4.36 STATE STOCK BK 3.94
CORN EXCHANGE BK 6.69 TOULON BK 3.90
CORN PLANTERS' BK 5.05 US STOCK BK 4.97
DOUGLAS BK 5.09 UNION BK,CHCGO 4.89
EJ TNKHM & CO BK 6.01 UNION COUNTY BK 2.87
EAGLE BK OF ILL 4.83 WARREN COUNTY BK 5.25
EDGAR CNTY BK 4.84 WESTERN BK O/ILL 4.91
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Table 6: Sharpe Ratio for the Illinois Free Banks in November 1860
 
Bank Sharpe Ratio Bank Sharpe Ratio
AGRICLTRE BK 46.11% FMRS' BK O/ILL,MTR 18.29%
ALISANA BK 18.66% FRANKLIN BK 33.41%
ALTON BK 16.37% FRONTIER BK 22.19%
AMERICAN BK 154.01% FULTON BK 42.89%
AMER EX BK 17.45% GARDEN STATE BK 25.31%
BK O/ALBION 49.51% GRAND PRARIE BK 10.23%
BK O/ALEDO 36.38% GRAYVILLE BK 6.79%
BK O/AMER,CHCGO 3.93% HAMPDEN BK 23.05%
BK O/AMER,MT.CARMEL 25.50% HIGHLAND BK -7.79%
BK O/AURORA 4.94% HUMBOLDT BK 21.58%
BK O/BENTON 20.10% ILL. CENTRAL BK 33.47%
BK O/BLMNGTN 65.20% ILL RIVER BK 21.82%
BK O/BRKLYN 30.00% ILL ST SCRTY BK 27.05%
BK O/CARMI 14.10% ILL STATE BK 25.07%
BK O/CHESTER 6.85% INTERNATIONAL BK 53.61%
BK O/COMMERCE 32.87% JERSEY COUNTY BK 32.64%
BK O/CMMNWLTH 4.36% KANKAKEE BK 23.92%
BK O/ELGIN 28.00% KASKASKIA BK 20.86%
BK O/FED UNION 8.09% LAFAYETTE BK 7.90%
BK O/GALENA 21.90% LAKE MICHIGAN BK 32.15%
BK O/GENESEO 10.45% LANCASTER BK 18.42%
BK O/ILL,NEW HVN 46.67% MARINE BK 30.43%
BK O/INDEMNITY 41.09% MRSHLL CNTY BK 52.56%
BK O/JCKSN CNTY 25.69% MCLEAN CNTY BK 14.06%
BK O/MTRPLS 26.92% MERCH & DRVRS BK,JLT 22.02%
BK O/NAPERVLL 15.42% MERCHANT'S BK,CARMI 34.25%
BK O/NRTHRN ILL* 3.93% MISS RIVER BK 35.20%
BK O/PERU 7.25% MORGAN CNTY BK 6.29%
BK O/PIKE CNTY 19.37% NARRAGANSETT BK 26.25%
BK O/QUINCY 5.00% NATIONAL BK 5.71%
BK O/RALEIGH 9.02% NEW MARKET BK 20.47%
BK O/SO ILL 16.31% OHIO RIVER BK 22.26%
BK O/SPARTA 99.51% OLYMPIC BK 42.89%
BK O/REPUBLIC 25.21% PAMET BK 6.78%
BELVIDERE BK 9.28% PATRIOTIC BK 31.20%
BULLS HEAD 30.75% PITTSFIELD BL 28.76%
CANAL BK 21.89% PLOWMAN'S BK 21.27%
CENTRAL BK 36.60% PRARIE STATE BK 30.41%
CHICAGO BK 20.41% RAILROAD BK 27.46%
CITIZEN'S BK 5.85% REAPERS BK 19.18%
CITY BK,OTTAWA 28.19% REED'S BK 3.93%
COLUMBIAN BK 38.26% ROCK ISLAND BK 3.93%
COMM BK O/NW HVN 22.89% SHAWANSES BK 31.02%
COMM BK/PALSTN 26.89% SO BK O/ILL,GRYVL 12.07%
COMM BK,CHCGO 18.52% STATE BK O/ILL 31.72%
CONTINENTAL BK 25.71% STATE STOCK BK 38.26%
CORN EXCHANGE BK 7.04% TOULON BK 36.45%
CORN PLANTERS' BK 28.16% US STOCK BK 19.18%
DOUGLAS BK 20.93% UNION BK,CHCGO 20.30%
EJ TNKHM & CO BK 35.76% UNION COUNTY BK 36.55%
EAGLE BK OF ILL 20.92% WARREN COUNTY BK 12.45%
EDGAR CNTY BK 26.09% WESTERN BK O/ILL 20.20%
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